

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.232  
14 September 1965  
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**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 14 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

(Poland)

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Bulgaria:

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Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

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Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

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Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. S.V. PURUSHOTTAM

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT  
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Republics:

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Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV  
Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV  
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United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
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Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT  
Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. P.S. BRIDGES

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of  
the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the two hundred and thirty-second plenary meeting of the Conference or the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee has before it an informal text of the draft report to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations and to the General Assembly, and steps have been taken to distribute it as an official document of the Conference in all the languages of the Conference.<sup>1/</sup> I presume that the members of the Committee would like to have more time in which to study the draft, and to discuss it perhaps at a later meeting. If that is so, we will proceed to our normal business: namely, statements by members of the Committee.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Our Committee, after a month and a half of work, is today on the eve of adjourning, and the time has come to review what we have done and what we could envisage either in the immediate or the near future.

During this session we have had interesting and certainly useful discussions. Important problems of very great urgency have been examined. In particular, new efforts have been made to resolve the problem of non-proliferation. The Western delegations have not remained inactive, and the United States delegation, supported by the other Western delegations, has submitted to the Conference a draft treaty on non-dissemination (ENDC/152).

That proposal, an important and serious one, has already been extensively debated, but unfortunately the delegations of the Soviet Union and its allies have not yet accepted it. We should like to cherish the hope that that is not their last word, and without being discouraged we shall continue to press, here or at the United Nations, for the conclusion of that treaty. In the meantime, however, as Lord Chalfont stated during his noteworthy statement of 9 September (ENDC/PV.231, p.5), our Committee runs the risk of adjourning in a state of deadlock. That is very regrettable, I would even say dangerous, in view of the ever-increasing urgency -- stressed several times here -- of the adoption of measures aimed at preventing dissemination of nuclear weapons.

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<sup>1/</sup> Circulated as document ENDC/156.

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The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fanfani, stated on 29 July: "But if it should not be possible to prepare within a reasonable time such a draft comprising obligations for both the nuclear and the non-nuclear countries, the Italian delegation would reserve the right to appeal to the non-nuclear countries to take an initiative which, without prejudice to their own points of view, would fix a certain period for a moratorium on the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries, particularly those close to nuclear capability, might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being understood of course that if their ... demands were not complied with during that time-limit, they would resume their freedom of action.

"In that way a respite would be given to the anxiety about nuclear dissemination and, moreover, a factor of pressure and persuasion would be created which could be brought to bear on the nuclear countries in order to spur them to conclude a general agreement, thus speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament. Thus a message of peace and good will could be given to the world, a message to which no one -- it is to be hoped -- could remain insensible." (ENDC/PV.219, pp. 18, 19)

Those words have not remained without effect. They have met with a response, either in this Conference or elsewhere. The Swedish delegation was the first to express its favourable opinion. At our meeting of 10 August Mrs. Myrdal said:

"Even if a major result at this session is not in the offing, we should at least be able to take a few strides forward. One such minimum programme has been offered to us in the field of non-dissemination. I refer to the proposal made by the Italian Foreign Minister ..." (ENDC/PV.222, p.19)

After citing that proposal Mrs. Myrdal continued: "It is possible that this proposal may prove valuable (ibid.)", and, referring to the moratorium, went on:

"As far as my own country is concerned, I can say that if such a decision seemed to rally support on the part of non-nuclear nations, we would be ready to give it positive consideration." (ibid., p.20)

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At our meeting of 12 August the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, expressed his broad agreement with the Fanfani idea, which he quoted at length, commenting in this connexion:

"That is certainly a fine sentiment, and it deserves respect not only because it is expressed by the Foreign Minister of a great country, but also because it can perhaps be dovetailed into a satisfactory and rational arrangement."

(ENDC/PV.223, p.17)

At our meeting of 17 August the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, dealt at length with the Fanfani proposal, which he was good enough to praise, calling it a "realistic" suggestion if it proved impossible to draw up within a reasonable time a draft treaty which would also include correlative obligations for the nuclear Powers. After quoting from Mr. Fanfani's statement, he added:

"It is in a similar way ... that we in Mexico and Latin America understand the stages of this regressive process -- sit venia verbo ... -- of non-proliferation ..." (ENDC/PV.224, p.33)

At the same meeting Mr. Correa do Lago, the representative of Brazil, after speaking about non-dissemination and referring to the Fanfani proposal, declared:

"I am sure that the suggestion made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy ... could prove to be a useful instrument ... and merits careful study." (ibid., p.14)

During our meeting of 31 August the head of the Nigerian delegation, Mr. Obi, indicated his approval of Mr. Fanfani's idea and promised his support, saying:

"Because we feel strongly that no effort should be spared in the search for adequate measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, no matter how tentative and limited, we listened with rapt attention and interest to the Italian idea on this subject as enunciated by the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Fanfani ... We not only warmly welcome this initiative but are also prepared to give it our support when ... developed." (ENDC/PV.228, pp.18, 19)

Moreover, while much support for the Italian idea was being received in Rome through diplomatic channels and during confidential contacts between chancelleries, the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Rusk, said to the Press on 2 August:

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"I believe that if the non-nuclear countries committed themselves not to have nuclear weapons that would be a very constructive development. I know that a very important proposal to this end has been made by Mr. Fanfani. I think that his idea represents an important contribution. That suggestion could prove very constructive and capable of wide development."

Recently the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in the Danish Parliament that, if the Fanfani proposal were transmitted to the United Nations by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, -

"... it would be natural for us to vote in favour of the proposal, whether in the First Committee or in the General Assembly itself, and to endeavour to get it approved. If that proposal were accepted we should be prepared to participate in the suggested agreement."

Lastly, the international Press, through its most representative organs of various nationalities and particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, also supported what has been called, rather prematurely, the "Fanfani non-dissemination plan".

All this convinced us that the idea of a controlled nuclear moratorium -- on which for our part we reflected for a long time before submitting it to the Conference -- was valid and answered to real needs, to widely-shared preoccupations and to possibilities of agreement.

That is why my delegation has now decided to submit to the Conference a draft declaration covering the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear countries for a specified period. Before giving a brief explanation of the contents of the text (ENDC/157), which has been circulated to all members of the Committee, I should like to make the following preliminary remarks.

There are two reasons for the choice of today's date for the submission of our text: the desire not to limit the discussion of the draft treaty on non-dissemination (ENDC/152) by presenting our text earlier; and the desire not to let this session of the Conference go by without taking up again an idea which, until a treaty has been achieved, could open up immediate prospects of checking nuclear dissemination.

The Italian delegation realizes that, in view of the forthcoming adjournment of the Conference, the Committee cannot discuss immediately the proposal which we have put forward. We therefore request that the document submitted by the Italian delegation be transmitted to the United Nations as an annex to the report of this Committee and

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that it remain on the agenda of the Conference for future sessions. Naturally, if certain delegations wish to ask questions or give their views at once, we shall be happy to answer them and to take full account of their opinions.

As Mr. Fanfani himself clearly indicated at the outset (ENDC/PV.219, pp. 18,19), the draft declaration which we are submitting to the Committee is not an alternative to the non-dissemination treaty which we have proposed (ENDC/152), nor should it hold up any progress that might be possible towards that end. The declaration is intended to gain time and facilitate progress. The declaration we are proposing is a unilateral one -- a unilateral manifestation of good will; it does not have the character of a contractual commitment. Nevertheless, in our opinion it would have full force of law, committing to a certain line of conduct the countries subscribing to it in the conditions provided for by the declaration itself. If a country signing the declaration had already entered into contractual commitments with other countries in respect of the question forming the subject of the declaration, those commitments would obviously remain valid in accordance with the general rules of international law.

In regard to the way in which the draft declaration is worded, I should like to point out that our aim in presenting it is above all to give a first concrete draft form to an idea, to prepare an outline, guide or model. We believe that, for the declarations which we envisage to be generally effective, they should be convergent and should contain certain essential elements, and it is some of those elements which we have indicated in our draft. However, since the declarations would be unilateral manifestations of intention, they might also be differently worded or might take different forms, each country remaining free to choose the form or language best suited to it, provided that the essential point was maintained.

I shall now deal in more detail with the content of our text, but I do not think it calls for long explanations. In the preamble we have recalled certain principles or obligations which appear to us to be fundamental and which derive from the very concept of our initiative, in particular the conviction that during the moratorium period the nuclear countries should engage in a process of ceasing to build up and reducing their nuclear arsenals.

Then come two operative paragraphs indicating the undertakings into which the countries signatory to the declaration should enter. The obligations provided for in

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sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the first operative paragraph are in conformity with our well-known stand, which aims at preventing the creation of any new independent national nuclear centre while permitting possible forms of co-operation or nuclear integration which would not involve that danger. On the other hand it is laid down that, in order to provide reciprocal guarantees of the faithful implementation of the declaration, the signatory countries shall accept the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or similar safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

The second operative paragraph provides that the signatories to the declaration shall consult with each other before the expiration of the moratorium period in order to extend it, considering any progress made towards international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, halt the arms race and reduce nuclear arsenals. The signatories could resume their freedom of action if they did not consider that there had been satisfactory progress.

The text of the declaration is as complete as possible at the present time; but it does not provide a solution to a number of problems which will have to be studied in depth later.

First, in the operative paragraphs there are two blanks. They concern the duration of the moratorium and the number of countries which would have to sign the declaration in order that it could enter into force. Those are two very delicate questions, with regard to which it may be premature to make specific proposals. That could be done later by common agreement.

Further, no procedure is specifically indicated in the draft declaration for making the declaration public once it has been signed. One might, for example, provide that the declarations, though unilateral, should be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat; but other appropriate procedures might also be devised.

Finally, the draft declaration does not contain any suggestion for the solution of a question of which I fully realize the great importance and delicacy: namely the co-ordination and timing of the accession of the various countries. It might happen that a country, though desiring to sign the declaration, would not do so unless it were quite sure that a certain other country would do likewise. It is

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also possible that the two countries in question might have difficulties in reaching agreement or in entering into direct contact. That is a problem which could hardly be solved by a rigid procedure laid down in a text. It would have to be approached in a flexible manner, on the practical level, and dealt with through prudent arrangements and appropriate soundings carried out by carefully-chosen intermediaries. Possibly the Rome Government, which has taken the initiative of proposing this declaration, might if it proved useful co-operate to that end with those countries with which it maintained relations. I think also that the Eighteen-Nation Committee, thanks particularly to its composition, could play an extremely useful role in this matter.

That concludes my remarks on the text submitted by the Italian delegation. As can be seen, it is a preliminary text, devoid of all rigidity and intended merely as a basis -- we hope a useful basis -- for our future work. We hope that when the time comes we may count upon the suggestions and co-operation of all delegations in perfecting and developing the draft. I apologize for having taken up so much of the Committee's time, but I thought it was my duty to explain in fairly ample detail the reasons for and the scope of our initiative. Before concluding I should like to add a few words to reaffirm the intentions which inspired the action of the Italian delegation.

Though our text is not complete, we do not claim to put forward an integral solution to the problem of non-dissemination; that still lies, as I have stated, in the conclusion of a general treaty. However, if the conclusion of such a treaty were delayed, we believe that the accession of a large number of countries to the declaration which we propose, when it was duly completed and perfected, would effectively remove the immediate danger of dissemination while giving to the non-nuclear Powers, as a counterpart, a means of ensuring that the nuclear Powers should use the prescribed period to agree upon a process of ceasing to build up and reducing their nuclear armaments.

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In this connexion, as we know, a number of proposals have been submitted to the Conference. Some of those proposals, such as those on the cut-off of production of nuclear material for military purposes and of certain types of nuclear vehicles (ENDC/120), have already been debated at length, so they might be ripe for an agreement. The transfer to peaceful uses of large quantities of military fissile material, among other measures, associated with the cut-off, would very well come within the scope of the immediate advantages which could be given to the countries signatory to the declaration. The expiration of the moratorium and the possibility for the non-nuclear Powers to regain their freedom of action at that date should hasten and encourage the conclusion of such agreements.

The Italian delegation hopes that the appeal made by Mr. Fanfani in his statement of 29 July (ENDC/PV.219), which has today been given its first concrete form in draft, will meet with a broad positive response among countries sincerely desiring to limit the nuclear danger without delay. We hope that the United Nations General Assembly will show interest in our proposal and that later -- if a non-dissemination treaty still proves impossible -- our initiative may be further developed and made more specific.

Whatever the fate of our proposal, I wish to assure the Conference that it is submitted in a spirit of sincerity on our part and with faith in the good will of others. This proposal has been dictated by our desire for peace and by our earnest wish for greater reciprocal security. We are convinced that if the possible temptations for the non-nuclear countries were to be removed for a number of years, and if the nuclear Powers were to avail themselves of that respite to redouble their efforts to achieve disarmament, the world would enjoy a happy period of calm. During that period of calm much mistrust, many misunderstandings and a good deal of hostility might vanish and encouraging prospects of security, mutual understanding and enduring peace might arise and be strengthened.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): The declaration submitted by the delegation of Italy will be circulated by the Secretariat as a document of the Conference.<sup>1/</sup>

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): With the approach of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, we are now nearing the end of the present series of negotiations in our Committee. Although we made rather a slow beginning, it is extremely gratifying to note that, as our debate developed, we were able to make

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noteworthy progress in defining the issues, in pinpointing the differences, and in charting possible courses of action so that, when we reconvene, we can proceed forward from the positions we have already reached. We shall now discuss these and other problems of disarmament in a larger forum, and we trust that those discussions will give the needed impetus to our future negotiations in this Committee.

In this short intervention I propose to confine myself to the extremely useful debate that we have had on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. All speakers, representing aligned as well as non-aligned nations, have contributed substantially to our efforts in clarifying the issues involved in the problem. We have heard highly illuminating and able expositions of the various points of view; and the Indian delegation is happy to observe that in their recent statements many delegations have made sincere efforts to appreciate the proposition put forward by us on this question (ENDC/144, pp. 10 et seq). In particular it is extremely gratifying to note that the non-aligned delegations have put forward, with a varying degree of emphasis, a similar approach to the basic contours of the problem.

As far as the Indian position is concerned, there is little I need add to the statements made by me earlier. To summarize, however, our basic approach to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is that the question of further proliferation is causatively linked with that of existing proliferation. In fact, as happened in the past in other countries, the domestic debate which goes on at present in some countries is due solely to the unhealthy impact of the proliferation that has taken place so far and is taking place today. As I said at our meeting on 12 August:

"Further proliferation is in fact a consequence of existing proliferation, and unless we deal with the disease itself we can effect no cure. By ignoring the disease and trying to deal with vague symptoms and unreal lists of probable nuclear countries, we shall only make the disease more intractable." (ENDC/PV.223, p.16)

The only rational and effective way to solve this problem, therefore, is to deal with both those facets of proliferation together. It is indeed unfruitful to deal with only one of those facets of this same phenomenon, particularly as in our view what it is sought so to tackle -- namely, further proliferation -- is only the consequence and not the cause of the malady.

I thought I would elaborate in this context the phrase used by me in my statement of 12 August relating to the assumption of "prior commitments" by the nuclear Powers. I said:

"No international treaty can, therefore, be acceptable which issues dictates only to non-nuclear countries not to do this or that, particularly when the countries possessing nuclear weapons do not assume any prior commitments themselves." (ibid., p.15)

I should like to emphasize that it was not our thesis that only the nuclear Powers should assume obligations, or that they must necessarily take appropriate steps before the non-nuclear countries assume the requisite obligations; although it might be logical to suggest that in a comprehensive solution of the problem the cause may be dealt with first and the consequence thereafter, at least structurally, if not chronologically. However, as I said earlier, by the phrase "prior commitment" we do not mean necessarily "prior action". We believe that as long as the two inseparable aspects of the problem, namely present proliferation and future proliferation, are dealt with simultaneously in a single or integrated process of obligations and actions we shall be effecting a real and abiding solution of the problem.

We are not rigid about the actual terms of the international instrument that may be devised as long as the basic approach is reflected in that instrument --- as long as, pari passu with the international renunciation by the non-nuclear countries of production, acquisition and control of, and access to, nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers renounce further production of nuclear weapons and reach agreement on a reduction of existing stockpiles. As I said earlier, there may be many ways of implementing this approach, and we should welcome suggestions from the nuclear Powers on which of the ways, in their view, would be appropriate. If they wish to give a lead and take some early steps, as they have done in many matters in the past, we shall applaud such initiative on their part. If, on the other hand, for understandable reasons, they are not in a position to take any prior steps, we shall not press them to do so. What we really advocate is that the two aspects of proliferation should be dealt with simultaneously.

It is not proper or adequate, in our opinion, to say that the non-nuclear countries must first assume obligations to prevent what has been described as "further proliferation" while the nuclear Powers only make general statements approving the principle of halting and reducing the existing proliferation. If it is considered by the nuclear Powers that there is no practical possibility of according a higher priority to the elimination of existing proliferation, then it is equally clear that a higher priority cannot be given to the prevention of further proliferation.

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It was in the context of this flexibility of approach that we commended (ENDC/PV.223, p.17) the statement made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Italy (ENDC/PV.219, pp.18, 19). It should be emphasized that the suggestion of his Excellency Mr. Fanfani was posited squarely and unmistakably on a single draft comprising obligations for both the nuclear weapon countries and the non-nuclear weapon countries, and the Indian delegation felt that the Fanfani approach could conceivably be dovetailed into a satisfactory arrangement. Again, I should like to stress, lest there be any misunderstanding, that such dovetailing can be done in several ways. We are not pressing a particular formula, although we may have preferences; we are only suggesting that the nuclear Powers should give serious thought to this idea; for, after all, it is they who are intimately concerned with any process which involves cessation of production and elimination of existing stockpiles.

In this context we are glad that the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, presented this morning a draft declaration for a moratorium on nuclear weapons to be observed by the non-nuclear countries (ENDC/157). The draft covers some of the ideas expressed by His Excellency Mr. Fanfani in his high-minded initiative, and we shall give it full and sympathetic consideration.

We are happy to note also that in their recent statements various delegations have accepted the logic of our proposition. Our appeal to the nuclear Powers, therefore, is that they should implement by actual action the appreciation they have expressed of the thesis that there should be no enshrinement or perpetuation of a privileged status of nuclear Powers. I was greatly impressed by what the distinguished Minister for the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, said at our last meeting:

"If the non-nuclear Powers demand nuclear disarmament before a non-proliferation agreement and if the nuclear Powers insist on non-proliferation before nuclear disarmament, then we shall get nowhere." (ENDC/PV.231,p.15)

It is on the basis of this fundamental truth that we have approached the draft treaty before us. We believe that a rational international treaty on non-proliferation should specifically embrace the essential requirements of cessation of production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and agreed arrangements for reduction of existing stockpiles thereof. Dealing only with the limited question of what is being described as "further proliferation" or "proliferation to new countries" does not deal with the real problem at all.

That was also the approach that the Disarmament Commission recommended to this Committee. The Disarmament Commission was quite clear in its resolution DC/225 (ENDC/149) that the problem to be dealt with was proliferation, and not only further proliferation.

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The Disarmament Commission also asked the Committee to consider -

"...the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures". (ibid.)

I repeat, "a programme of certain related measures".

In our Committee, however, we have a draft (ENDC/152) on a different subject, or, rather on a part of the subject recommended to us by the Disarmament Commission; and it seems to us that it does not reflect faithfully the view of the Disarmament Commission because it fails to give attention to a programme of related measures. I do not wish to go into the details of the text of the Disarmament Commission resolution, as such textual scrutiny is not likely to be fruitful. However, what is material is to stress the idea, the philosophy, that unless one adopts the right approach and follows the right path one is apt to lose the way. What I should like to emphasize, therefore, is our conviction, that, even if our efforts take a little time, we must build on a firm and solid foundation.

In conclusion, I should like to quote from one of the greatest and most revered books of all time, the Bible. It is a passage from the Gospel according to St. Matthew:

"Therefore whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock; and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not, for it was founded upon a rock. And everyone that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand; and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell, and great was the fall of it." (Matthew 7, 24-27)

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): As we near the close of this session, I should like to discuss the progress that we in the United States believe has been made towards achieving a non-proliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban. Those two subjects have commanded most of our attention at this session and they remain the most immediate problems before us.

First, let me describe the status of our efforts to secure a non-proliferation treaty. As you all know, my delegation tabled a draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152) at our 224th meeting. It was the product of efforts by the Canadian, Italian, United Kingdom and United States delegations. It was offered in response to suggestions by many countries

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that discussions on this subject would be more fruitful if we had a draft before us. We are grateful for the welcome it has received from a number of countries including, particularly, Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico and Nigeria. Nation after nation has proclaimed its dedication to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But this simple document is the first concrete expression of the means to that end to be presented to this or any other Conference.

At long last. at our 230th meeting last week, the Soviet representative addressed himself -- at least in a general way --- to the text of this draft. What he had to say was not altogether discouraging. Judging by his statement -- and he may correct me if I am wrong --- his Government can accept most of the language of the United States treaty concerning the obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

Ambassador Tsarapkin said that the United States draft treaty would ban -

"... the direct transfer of such weapons by nuclear to non-nuclear States, the transfer of such weapons through military alliances to the national control of non-nuclear States, and the creation by non-nuclear States of their own nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.230, p.6)

Certainly these prohibitions get at the heart of the proliferation problem. The Soviet representative's statement therefore means that we have come a long way towards concluding a non-proliferation agreement.

The Soviet representative of course went on to complain that the United States draft opened the door to the creation of multilateral nuclear forces. He said:

"...the United States draft opens up possibilities of establishing a multilateral nuclear force and giving the Federal Republic of Germany and other non-nuclear countries members of NATO access to nuclear weapons within the framework of such a force." (ibid.)

Here we must say that we think that Mr. Tsarapkin misunderstands the various outstanding proposals for NATO nuclear defences. We also think that he has not fully analysed the United States draft treaty. No proposal for a NATO nuclear force that the United States has put forward would provide access to nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear country. No such country would gain access to nuclear weapons design or manufacturing information; and no such country would acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, or the power itself to fire nuclear weapons. This is clear from the NATO nuclear defence

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proposals which the United States has put forward. It is clear from Articles I and II of our draft treaty. Indeed, it is clear from my country's atomic energy legislation, which is one of the basic laws of the United States.

The Soviet representative seems to be saying that the United States draft treaty permits of a NATO multilateral force, and that therefore it is inadequate no matter what restrictions it would impose on such a force and no matter what such a force would involve. He persists in saying that such a force would provide access to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear countries even though our statement and our basic legislation assure him to the contrary. If he continues to doubt us, let him sign our draft treaty, which would create an international obligation on our part to the Soviet Union to see that access would not occur. This should be more than adequate assurance to the Soviet Union if its concern about proliferation is genuine. If, on the other hand, its aim is to divide the Atlantic alliance and to interfere with the growth of political harmony in Western Europe, then there is nothing we can do to satisfy it.

My country is firm in its support for the alliance and for measures which will produce greater coherence among its members. Our institutions in the West are dynamic. They adjust to political, technological and military changes -- including such changes as the deployment in the Western part of the Soviet Union of many hundreds of missiles aimed directly at Western Germany and Western Europe. Indeed, there is no point in trying to draft a treaty which would preclude any adjustment by existing institutions to the many changes in international relations and in scientific knowledge which will inevitably occur during the course of time.

We have still not heard from the Soviet Union about the changes taking place in the Warsaw Pact with respect to arrangements for consultation or joint decision concerning nuclear weapons. As I have pointed out several times before, we know that the Soviet Union has recently turned over to its East European allies certain short-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. We have not been informed about the procedures

(Mr. Foster, United States)

for equipping those missiles with nuclear warheads, or for consulting with other governments as to their use. We have described in some detail to this Committee the strict control procedures we have in mind for a multilateral force. But we have heard no similar explanation from the Soviet Union. We trust that Ambassador Tsarapkin will supply us with this information as soon as possible - during the next session of this Committee at the latest.

Nevertheless, my delegation hopes that his statement of last week (ENDC/PV.230, p.6) concerning the United States draft treaty augurs well for our next session. If he can accept as much of the draft as that statement seems to indicate, then it should be possible to proceed with that draft as the basis for negotiations when we meet again. Let us not forget the Soviet representative's harsh rejection of a United States draft in 1962 (ENDC/59) which eleven months later became the basis for the negotiation of the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The Soviet Government also fiercely opposed the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet the Soviet Government later found that that accession did not preclude the improvement of German-Soviet relations. While the Soviet Union may never admit it, the inclusion of West Germany in NATO has clearly been a step towards stability and peace in Europe.

Leaving the discussion of the United States draft treaty on a hopeful note, let me welcome the imaginative Italian proposal to carry out the idea of Foreign Minister Fanfani. We endorse Ambassador Cavalletti's view that a draft treaty which could be signed by both nuclear and non-nuclear States should and must remain our chief objective. We hope that the next session of this Committee will see truly fruitful negotiations on such a treaty. If those negotiations should become prolonged, however, the Italian declaration (ENDC/157) could form a useful interim measure to freeze the present number of nuclear nations until a treaty can be achieved. Having finally come to grips with the concrete issues involved in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, we must persist in our efforts until a lasting agreement is concluded which would avert this serious threat to the security of every nation.

I should like now to turn to our test-ban discussions.

The instructions to my delegation from President Johnson were made clear at our first meeting. They are -- and I quote from President Johnson's message to this Committee -- "to work for a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty." (ENDC/150)

Pursuant to the President's instructions we presented at the 229th meeting a description of what we believe can be done on the problem of detection and identification, based on our continuing intensive research. We made it clear that the fundamental problem remains. Not all natural earthquakes can be positively identified -- that is, distinguished from man-made explosions -- by their seismic effects alone, but it would be possible to identify as earthquakes all but 20 per cent of those which cause seismic disturbances equivalent to explosions of a few kilotons of TNT if the world-wide system of large seismic arrays which I described at our meeting of 2 September (ENDC/PV.229, pp. 20 et seq) were installed.

It has been made clear, I think, that when we speak of "identification" we mean identification of earthquakes. It is not possible by seismic means to identify explosions as explosions, since there is no way of distinguishing them from all earthquakes. That is because some earthquakes look like explosions on seismographs -- or, conversely, explosions look just like some earthquakes.

It should also be clear that identification is the more important of the two steps, detection and identification. Detecting an earth tremor on a seismograph means only that something has happened to shake the earth. Identification of what that something is then becomes necessary. If the event can be identified as an earthquake, it can obviously not be an explosion.

With the world-wide system of large seismic arrays, it would be possible to show that many earthquakes could not be explosions -- either by the nature of the seismic record or by the location of the event. But there would continue to be the troublesome remainder, those events which could not be distinguished as natural or man-made, and which therefore would have to be identified by some other means.

We would apply our knowledge of identification, and the information from the proposed world-wide system of large arrays outside the USSR, to the earthquakes which would be detected each year in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Our estimate is that in the Soviet Union, for example, about forty-five underground events in an average year would still remain unidentified as earthquakes even if no underground tests occurred. If tests

(Mr. Foster, United States)

did occur, of course, they would be added to these forty-five unidentified events. And because the number of earthquakes varies from year to year, the mere addition of some unidentified events to the forty-five would not provide a significant clue as to their nature. On the other hand, the number forty-five could be reduced somewhat by using ocean-bottom seismometers to eliminate from the list some of the Soviet earthquakes which occur nearby in the Pacific Ocean. The system would have similar value in detecting and identifying events in the United States or elsewhere in the world.

There will still remain a significant number of events each year in the Soviet Union and elsewhere which cannot be identified and some on-site inspections will be required to provide assurance that these are not clandestine nuclear tests. There is no point in ignoring this fact. Up to now there has been no feasible suggestion for any other means of verification which would identify these unknown events and thereby assure everyone that no nuclear explosions were taking place.

I said at the opening of this session (ENDC/PV.218, p.14) that if an exploration of all the recent and prospective developments showed that this requirement could be satisfied by a different number and type of inspections than previously proposed, we would take those facts into account. I also invited other countries to submit data or research results. There have been helpful suggestions from Sweden and the United Kingdom, but the Soviet Union has given us no data and no research results. Its position remains one of obdurate refusal to consider any on-site inspections or to provide information showing how the need for such inspections could be overcome. Until there is some Soviet flexibility on this score, little progress seems possible.

That flexibility was clearly not present in the Soviet representative's statement last week (ENDC/PV.231). He simply gave new labels to old Soviet proposals. He supported a treaty ban on tests above a certain size and a moratorium on those below that size (ibid, p.35). Neither the treaty nor the moratorium would be accompanied by any on-site inspections. The proposal thus amounts to the same old thing — an unverified ban on all tests.

It has become habitual for the Soviet representative to cite the need for a political decision to break the deadlock in achieving a comprehensive test ban. If any political decision is needed, it is on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union alone stands in the way of an agreement to extend the limited test ban to cover all underground tests.

The United States is convinced that a comprehensive treaty can be achieved now and that the verification required to provide sufficient confidence in compliance by all parties would not be onerous, unnecessarily intrusive, or in any way prejudicial to the military security of any party. What is needed is a decision by the Soviet Union -- which by definition must be a political decision -- to abandon its outmoded preoccupation with total secrecy. In today's world such a preoccupation is not justifiable on either scientific or military grounds. We are convinced that an exchange of recent scientific information would demonstrate the validity of this conclusion to reasonable people everywhere.

Although our test-ban discussions have not ended on a note of hope, those on the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152) have certainly been more encouraging. We hope that this treaty will receive continued study by the members of this Committee and by all others who are concerned about preventing nuclear spread. We have offered it as the basis for serious negotiations and we stand ready to negotiate at any time. As the first draft treaty on this subject to be presented to the world, it merits the attention of all.

This morning the representative of India again stressed the need for prior commitments by the nuclear Powers to halt and begin cutting back on their nuclear build-up. My country's position on this is a matter of record. The measures we have proposed for a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles and a cut-off and transfer agreement on fissionable materials (ENDC/120) remain here on this table. We are ready to initiate detailed discussions and negotiations on those measures whenever the Soviet Union is ready.

When we return to Geneva, let us focus on the non-proliferation treaty again and on the test-ban problem. My delegation believes them to be the most urgent of all the further steps which can realistically be taken in the near future.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): My delegation will deal today with the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as my Government is still studying the draft treaty on non-dissemination (ENDC/152) presented by the United States delegation, in the light of the basic philosophy of the non-aligned nations on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which we have already explained here.

My delegation notes with satisfaction that our views on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as stated during this session have aroused great interest both inside and outside this Committee and have tended to dissipate the atmosphere of hopelessness which was looming over our work at this session.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Bearing in mind the declaration in the preamble to the Moscow Treaty that the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are --

"Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of

nuclear weapons for all time ..." (ENDC/100/Rev.1,)

and their determination "to continue negotiations to this end" (ibid.); fully conscious of the United Nations resolutions condemning all tests and lending a sense of urgency and priority to negotiations in this Committee to fulfil this aim; fully supported by world public opinion, which is demanding an immediate cessation of such tests; and encouraged by what we understood from the two co-Chairmen in their declarations at the opening meeting of this session (ENDC/PV.218) that we should redouble our efforts in this Committee despite the deteriorating international situation; my delegation, desiring to contribute its modest share in this respect, stated its view on how to make progress in the negotiations on the cessation of underground tests. In doing so we took into account the fact that we are in 1965 and that considerable progress has been made in detection and identification techniques -- a matter linked to the question of securing compliance with any agreement on the cessation of tests.

On 17 August we put forward some ideas (ENDC/PV.224, pp. 9/10) which we hoped might help to break the deadlock we have encountered in this matter and provide a basis for serious negotiations in the future for anybody keen or interested to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances, arrest the course of the nuclear arms race, and promote the cause of disarmament. We have noted that quite a number of delegations did not misread the label on our views and reacted to what we said in the same considered manner to which we have become accustomed throughout the three years of our work in this Committee. We should like to thank all the delegations which have approved and declared their acceptance of all or part of our views, or have promised to study them more thoroughly.

My delegation does not expect -- and, as a matter of fact, nor does any delegation -- to see its views or proposals accepted immediately and fully by all concerned. But the views put forward by the non-aligned States tend to widen the area of basic agreement, lessen the gap between the sides or incite both parties to reconsider their positions in due time in the light of changing political situations or improvements in science and technology, and might persuade them to accept compromise solutions which were unthinkable two or three years earlier. Our most elementary duty here is to try to achieve that aim.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

We are indeed happy to learn that the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Chalfont, and the leader of the Canadian delegation, Mr. Burns, each read correctly the message contained in our views of 17 August on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and each sensed immediately the opportunity offered by the acceptance in principle by the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.230 p.9) of a certain threshold with a moratorium and the implication such acceptance might hold as regards starting a useful dialogue with the Soviet Union on this issue.

In this context it might be pertinent to mention a question raised by Mr. Foster in his article in the July issue of Foreign Affairs, at the end of his comments on the banning of underground tests. He said:

"Whether we can thus close the gap between the American and Soviet positions remains to be seen in further discussions" (Vol.43, No.4, p.595)  
In the light of our views as stated at the 224th meeting and of the comments made on them by the delegations of Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Canada, and other delegations, and in the light of the necessity for further discussions referred to by Mr. Foster, the United Arab Republic still hopes that the three nuclear Powers represented in the Committee will be in a position during the forthcoming recess to continue discussion on this subject and to report success to the next session of the General Assembly. We are here, however, large or small States, nuclear or non-nuclear Powers, not in order to dictate a policy but to try to reach common ground; and the most fruitful way to do that is by talks, while we still have time to talk.

My delegation has always tried to keep the atmosphere in our Committee serene, despite the delicate and sensitive issues involved in our deliberations; but unfortunately something was said at our last meeting which my delegation cannot pass over in silence because it might touch our status of non-alignment, which is a basic principle of the composition of this Committee. In refuting the Soviet position on underground tests, Mr. Foster used the phrase "it has a new label" (ENDC/PV.231, p.38). Since our views were at the centre of the rather heated debate which provoked that remark from the representative of the United States, my delegation feels that that phrase, taken at its face value, might create, rightly or wrongly, the impression that it was meant to be a reflexion on our attitude as a non-aligned nation in this Conference.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Mr. Foster, who has always displayed a high degree of statemanship here, must be aware of the serious implication of such an impression if it were left unanswered. Therefore I cannot but strongly object to such an attitude. I do not intend to pursue the matter any further; but I had to make that clarification in order to keep the record straight and to preserve the standard of our deliberation as high as it has always been during the past three years; because if we start labelling each other's resolutions, proposals, ideas or views, that will be a regrettable sign of decadence in our Committee's work.

I do hope that our course of action in this Conference will facilitate the fulfilment of our basic and difficult task of achieving peace through disarmament, at a time when the world around us is burning, suffering and falling to pieces.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): My remarks will be very brief. They arise out of what has been said in the Committee this morning and there are simply two points to which I should like to refer.

First, I was most grateful to the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, for his further clarification of his Government's approach to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons. It was a constructive and helpful contribution, and we shall study it with great care. In the meantime I was particularly impressed with his view that, although the relative problems of proliferation and nuclear disarmament should be approached concurrently -- or, as he said, simultaneously --, there must also be flexibility about the way in which we approach them.

As our colleague Mr. Foster has said, a Western proposal to freeze the production of nuclear weapons already exists (ENDC/120), and I very much hope that we may before long be able to enter into some serious negotiations on that and other measures designed to halt the nuclear arms race and put it into reverse. In any case the attitude reflected in Mr. Trivedi's remarks on proliferation, and indeed the remarks of the representative of the United Arab Republic on a comprehensive test ban, reinforce my view that in the short time we have spent here this summer we have, if we have done nothing else, laid the foundations upon which we shall be able to build usefully when we return here, as I hope and expect we soon shall.

My second point concerns what has come to be called the "Fanfani proposal" (ENDC/157). In this respect I should like to join my United States colleagues in welcoming the

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

contribution which the Italian representative has made today to our discussions on the problem of non-dissemination. As Mr. Cavalletti himself has pointed out, the Italian proposal for a unilateral non-acquisition declaration is, of course, no substitute for the conclusion of a non-dissemination treaty. It is necessarily a partial and a temporary measure; whereas, as the Committee is aware, we are convinced that a full solution in the form of a non-dissemination treaty is essential. Nevertheless, if it should prove in our future discussions in this Committee that the delay in negotiating such a treaty will be a long one, then the Italian proposal could be a useful means of stabilizing the position, and might then perhaps ease our negotiations for a more far-reaching and permanent solution of that problem.

I hope, therefore, that when this Committee resumes and we continue our discussions, as we shall, on the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, we shall be able to give to the present Italian proposal the careful consideration which it merits.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): There are some procedural questions which we have to settle before we close the meeting. The first is the date of the adjournment of the session. A wish was expressed at our last meeting that there should be a joint recommendation of the co-Chairmen on the subject. Such a recommendation has been submitted: namely, to adjourn the Conference on 16 September. I understand that there is a consensus in the Committee to accept that recommendation. If that is the case, I shall consider the recommendation accepted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): There is now the question of whether the announcement of the date of the adjournment of the session should be included in the communiqué today or in the communiqué of our final meeting of this session. I should like to hear the opinions of members of the Committee on that subject.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I think my United States colleague and co-Chairman, Mr. Foster, will agree with me, as will also the other members of the Committee, that we ought to follow previous practice and to announce the adjournment in the communiqué of our final meeting. Thus no question at all arises in this regard.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): The representative of the Soviet Union has proposed that the announcement of the adjournment of the Committee's work should be included in the communiqué of our last meeting on Thursday.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): Are there any further remarks? If not, I shall take it that the Committee decides to include the date of the adjournment of the session in the communiqué of our last meeting on Thursday.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): There is another question of procedure on which I understand the representative of Mexico would like to speak.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): Since it may be advisable not to leave over until the final meeting which, as we have just heard, will be on Thursday, consideration of the co-Chairmen's report which has been circulated this morning (ENDC/156), as well as other questions that might arise, the Mexican delegation, for its own part and believing that it interprets correctly the views of its colleagues from the non-aligned countries, considers that we should envisage the possibility mentioned at our last meeting. Consequently we formally move that, if there is no major inconvenience, an additional meeting should be held tomorrow 15 September.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): We have a proposal that an additional meeting should be held tomorrow Wednesday. Are there any objections or remarks? If there are no objections, I take it that it is so decided.

It was so decided.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): I note that we have agreed to adjourn on Thursday, 16 September, and I note also from the draft report of the co-Chairmen -- we are not yet considering that document, but this links up with the adjournment -- that we are supposed to reconvene as soon as possible. If, when we consider the draft report -- which we shall do on Thursday, presumably -- we are going to announce the date of the adjournment in our last communiqué, I assume that we should include in it the date of our reconvening as well.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

I should like to remind the Committee of a suggestion which I made during the recent informal discussion on this subject and which was not opposed from any quarter at that time: namely, that the co-Chairmen should consider the desirability of proposing to the Committee a fixed date for reconvening. I wished to raise this matter once more only to refresh the minds of the members of the Committee and of the co-Chairmen, so that they might consider the possibility of suggesting a date for reconvening next time we meet, and because I might have to raise the point when we come to consider the draft report. I trust that it will be possible for us to agree on a date for reconvening.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): The Committee has heard the view expressed by the representative of Nigeria that a date should be fixed for reconvening the Conference. I am sure the co-Chairmen will take into account the remarks just made; and in any event we shall have the opportunity to discuss the matter when we deal with the draft report as a whole.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 232nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Goldblat, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, India, the United States, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Mexico and Nigeria.

"The delegation of Italy tabled a draft of a unilateral non-acquisition declaration.<sup>1/</sup>

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 15 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

1/ Circulated as document ENDC/157